This study examines the linear relationship between corporate attributes and corporate accruals (discretionary accruals) in Bangladesh. The behaviour of corporate accruals is explained by corporate attributes such as asset size, turnover, earnings per share, number of shareholders, year of listing, international link of audit firm, ownership structure, internationality, market category, and leverage. A statistically significant relationship is observed between corporate accruals and asset size. We also observed inconsistent growth of inventory, faster growth of accounts receivable with an overvaluation of fixed assets reported by probe committee. Indeed, corporate accruals are not dependent on corporate attributes but rather on the mindset of the corporate manager. Management is in a unique position to produce fraudulent financial statements. The study suggests a number of measures including the establishment of an Institute of Chartered Surveyor of Bangladesh (ICSB), the introduction of audit reviews, the updating of corporate governance guidelines, increasing the effectiveness of board independence, and the strengthening institutional setting, in order to protect the rights of stakeholders, especially marginal shareholders.
The accrual method of accounting appears to be the most appropriate accounting method as it considers all business transactions (cash and non-cash) within an accounting period. Consequently, the operating performance of a company for said period can be measured accurately with financial statements providing an accurate and fair reflection of the reporting entity. On the other hand, accruals create an opportunity for corporate managers to manage earnings because they require managers to make forecasts, estimates, and judgments. Accrual accounting opens the door to opportunistic short-run income smoothing that can lead to future restatements and write-downs. With this method, the company does not change its activities, but rather creatively reports their income from an existing activity. Examples include increasing income by reducing allowance for doubtful accounts, capitalizing costs rather than expensing them, and avoiding asset write-offs. In business organizations, management can sometimes use its discretionary power to manipulate corporate financial reporting to achieve desired goals. The over-reporting or underreporting of earnings is a common practice in corporate accounting in Bangladesh. The recent crash of the capital market (2011) has led to an examination of malpractices in the Bangladeshi corporate sector. According to the capital market inquiry report (2011), accounting manipulation is one of the factors responsible for the crash. Management is in a unique position to produce fraudulent financial statements and the incidence of managerial opportunism in corporate financial reporting in Bangladesh is very high (Hasan et al., 2014) .
The Bangladesh capital market experienced two bubble-burst episodes: one in 1996, the other in 2011. Generally, small investors do not have sufficient technical knowledge of accounting to understand how accounting can be manipulated. Furthermore, there are many institutional weaknesses that create an opportunity for managers to use their discretionary power when reporting corporate finances (opportunity factor of the fraud triangle). In addition, there are a number of failings in the corporate environment such as the almost complete absence of board independence, the fact that the majority of companies are family-run, CEO duality, the distinct lack of professionalism in the boardroom or work place, inherent institutional weaknesses, and reliance upon political connections to name a few. Given the aforementioned flaws, corporate management is able to distort information (information asymmetry) in corporate reports either to show a rosier picture or a more vulnerable picture, depending on which one suits their purpose. Corporate managers are in a unique position to commit fraud and can manipulate accounting information for corporate stakeholders. Managers use their discretionary power when forecasting, estimating and making judgments in the preparation of financial reports. We use the term 'Corporate Accruals' (CA) instead of discretionary accruals since, by definition, it is a result of the management mindset.
Every company has its own vision, mission, goals, objectives, structure, features, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, work plans, and strategies, which distinguish it from other companies. The characteristics of each sample company are clearly different with regard to their size, nature of business, capital structure, management style, board independence, composition of board, quality of independent directors, corporate governance, ownership structure, business strategies, auditors quality, customers, access to financial services, leadership quality, innovation policy, entrepreneurship orientation, ethical culture, corporate social responsibility, corporate culture, ecological guidelines, market reputation, market capitalization, profitability and the like. The patience, experience, credentials, integrity, neutrality, professionalism and demographic information of auditors and accountants of these organizations are different, and they do not even all have the same accounting period. This divergence of corporate attributes may influence corporate accruals. The quality of accruals of a company depends on the portion of corporate accruals as a percentage of total accruals. The quality of accruals is high when the portion of corporate accruals is low or close to zero. At greater levels of corporate accruals as a percentage of total accruals, such accruals are judged to be of poor quality or no quality. The quality of accruals can vary among companies as a function of accruals even in the absence of intentional earnings manipulation. Both estimations and judgments are required in order to determine earnings, and some companies require more forecasts and estimates than others. Companies in growing industries, for example, will typically have high accruals, which calls into question their reliability as accruals are likely to contain estimation errors. Estimation errors reduce earning persistence (because they must be corrected in future earnings) and are irrelevant for valuation. Larger accruals therefore (positive or negative) may be indicative of a major underlying volatility in the company's operations and low-quality earnings.
Corporate attributes or corporate characteristics were first studied by Singhvi (1968 (DeAngelo, 1981; Haque, 1984; Hasan, 2012) while many other corporate attributes may also have ties to the corporate disclosure of financial reporting. But earlier researcher did not look at the relationship between corporate characteristics (attributes) and information asymmetry (corporate accruals). It is information asymmetry that allows such executives to disguise the real motives behind their actions. In other words, such unethical people are in a position to hide or distort information in such a way as to make many of these actions appear to be benign, or even in the best interests of stakeholders (Downes and Russ, 2005). The recent huge stock market crash in Bangladesh occurred following capital market reforms (as a result of the crash in 1996). There is an urgent need to determine if a significant relationship does exist between corporate accruals and corporate attributes. In this study we are primarily interested in the relationship between accounting information asymmetry and corporate attributes. A research gap exists and the paper aims to fill in the missing elements. Additional studies in this area are required to prevent managerial opportunism in corporate financial reporting. In these examples, researchers addressed the relationship between corporate attributes and corporate disclosures, namely the weighted disclosure index, unweighted disclosure index, disclosure score, and disclosure ratio, and showed that disclosure behaviour can be explained by corporate attributes. Their findings confirmed the hypothesis that that corporate attributes have a significant influence on the overall disclosure index. However, the same earlier studies did not examine the relationship between corporate attributes and corporate accruals. After the major crash of 2011, examining the relationship between corporate accruals and corporate attributes took on an even greater importance as listed companies' characteristics are different from each other. This is a very contemporary subject (research gap) and one which this paper aims to address. Moreover, additional studies need to be carried out in this area to reduce or eliminate the use of managerial opportunism in corporate financial reporting in Bangladesh. This study strives to fill the research gap by building an empirical model to establish whether corporate accruals are related to a number of company-specific characteristics using regression analysis. In other words, this paper is designed to form a graphical presentation to connect present research with the earlier studies. Figure 1 clearly shows that in the past, researchers focused on the influence of corporate attributes on corporate disclosures. In the diagram, the wave of corporate accruals influences corporate disclosures. The current study extends that research by examining the influence of corporate attributes on corporate accruals.
I Figure 1 . The concept of present research I 3. Data and methods
Data
Of the 155 non-financial companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), the largest capital market in Bangladesh, 68 were taken as a sample data set for the current study, based on access to their corporate annual reports for 2010-2011 Ownership structure is defi ned as foreign shareholders in the ownership of sample companies.
Code "1" for foreign ownership and "0" otherwise 0,1
Internationality is defi ned as majority of shares of sample companies held by foreigners.
Code "1" for international companies and "0" International link of audit fi rm is defi ned as the reputation of the auditor of sample companies that are linked to the foreign fi rm.
Code "1" for internationally linked audit fi rm and "0" otherwise.
0,1
Leverage (LVG) Leverage is defi ned as the long term loan in capital structure of sample companies.
Code "1" for debt capital and "0" otherwise. 0,1 deflated by lagged total assets (LTA, the total assets of the previous year), in order to reduce heteroskedasticity. 
International link of audit firm
The international link of audit firm may potentially influence the level of corporate accruals. A greater importance is usually attached to an audit firm that has an affiliation with a foreign audit firm (Big-Eight or Non-Big-Eight firms) compared to those with no foreign affiliation. In order to defend their reputation, larger firms usually produce higher G Table 2 . International link of audit firms
Leverage
Leverage is an important strategy for reducing a company's weighted average cost of capital. Debt is always considered an important source of finance in the business community. A company cannot pass even a single day without having a loan, for example, short-term loan. In fact, in business it works very much the same was as does blood in the human body. But, long-term loan or debt-capital is not used in the same way as a short-term loan. A company may take out a long-term loan or not, it depends on the financial strength of the company. If the company suffers from a shortage of long-term funds, it will not be able to implement its own investment project. It can therefore arrange a long-term loan to alleviate the financial needs of its investment project. Companies may take out loans from different sources as required and feel comfortable about doing so. Lending institutions always want to safeguard the funds they supply. First of all, they require sufficiently reliable information about the concern they have invested in or are going to invest in. Usually, it is assumed that companies that have debt-capital may engage in over reporting or under reporting earnings, resulting in increased or decreased corporate accruals compared to companies with no debt-capital. Therefore, leverage may be treated as a powerful element in determining the level of corporate accruals. 
I 4. Results and discussion
If we look at the results of the correlation matrix, in Table 3 we see that there are no multicollinearity issues between independent variables. The examination of multicollinearity between independent variables is essential because if multicollinearity issues do exist then we need to drop one of the variables from the model as the variables are measuring the same thing. Judge et al. (1985) and Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggest that simple correlation is not harmful unless they exceed 0.90. In the interpretation of the results of the multiple regression analysis, the observed correlations did not exceed 0.90 and are therefore not considered harmful.
G Table 3 .
Correlations matrix
If we look at the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis, Table 4 shows a significant relationship between asset size and corporate accruals. The graphical representation of ordinary least square model using AMOS appears in Figure 3 . Asset size has a significant effect on corporate accruals at the five-percent significance level. The other independent variables do not have any significant (linear) effect on corporate accruals. In principle, the value of a business is often reflected by its assets; therefore, the more assets a company can show on its books, the better it looks to investors and other stakeholders. Generally, companies use resources to earn money and pay off debts. The assets that are most commonly improperly valued are inventory, accounts receivable and fixed assets (Omar, 2012, p.7). We observed inconsistent growth of inventory, faster growth of accounts receivable and during investigation, the probe committee (2011) observed that companies were overstating their assets in the name of revaluation while deferred tax implications were not being properly accounted for in the financial statement (Table 5 ). Many companies even went so far as to illegally issue bonus shares based on these unreal gains. Revaluation of fixed assets tends to be carried out by certified chartered accountants. But in Bangladesh, chartered institutes of certified accountants and chartered certified accountants simply do not exist. Company auditors are doing the job of certified chartered accountants, something which is not internationally accepted. An improper asset valuation is classified as financial statement fraud (Omar, 2012). Indeed, corporate accrual (information asymmetry) is not a regular business variable and it does not stem from the business cycle but rather it is injected into the report through the mindset of corporate managers.
G Table 4 . Regression weights G I Figure 3 . Graphical output of OLS model using AMOS Agency problems exist between management and shareholders in the Bangladeshi corporate sector (Hasan et al., 2014). It could easily be understood that corporate management uses its position to draft financial statements that ensure a positive representation of management performance in running the business. They are in a unique position to use their discretionary power to produce fraudulent financial reports and it is well known that fraudulent financial reports do not depend on any regular variables of the business cycle but rather on the mindset of corporate managers. The separation of ownership and control creates an information asymmetry between management and shareholders whereby owners are not provided with the information to be able to accurately assess the decisions made by managers (Downes and Russ, 2005). Unethical managers can take advantage of information asymmetry and use their positions to further their own agendas rather than those of owners, engaging in so-called managerial opportunism (Williamson, 1996) . It is information asymmetry that allows immoral executives to disguise the real motives behind their actions. They are in a position to hide or distort information in such a way as to make many of their actions appear benign or even in the best interests of the shareholders. Consequently, the level of confidence of external stakeholders on corporate financial reporting is still too low, as per the findings of earlier studies. Karim (1998) found that financial reporting in developing countries is generally characterized by a lack of transparency, adequacy, reliability and timeliness. Ahmed (1982) found that the image and reliability of financial statements prepared by Bangladeshi companies are not up to international standards and in most cases, they are dressed up and embellished. What they reveal is interesting but what they conceal is vital. That is why nobody has confidence in said financial statements and hardly anybody uses them as a basis for making financial decisions. Rahman (1978) I
Conclusion
The study captures the relationship between corporate accruals and asset size. The study also observed the inconsistent growth of inventory, faster growth of accounts receivable and the overvaluation of fixed assets as reported by the probe committee (2011 
2016.
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A E S T I M AT I O the management mindset and is injected into the business reporting to hide or distort information to achieve desired goals. Institutional weakness, inefficient capital market, poor corporate governance, ineffective boards, lack of competent independent directors, no audit review, CEO duality, limited institutional investors in ownership, majority family ownership, political connections, no qualified accountant, no institute of chartered surveyor, etc., create opportunities for managerial opportunism in corporate financial reporting. They study recommends that an Institute of Chartered Surveyor be created immediately in order to ensure the provision of an accurate reflection of the fixed assets in the balance sheets. An audit review program should be introduced, corporate governance mechanism should be updated to ensure effective monitoring of management activities, and institutional capacity should be strengthened. Further research can be conducted to investigate other parts of financial statements such as concealed liabilities, fictitious revenues, timing differences, and improper disclosures.
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